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Executive Summary
This paper examines how the combination of indebtedness and exogenous shocks induce volatility for
the countries of Latin America.  An exogenous shock, such as a shock to world real rates of interest, petroleum
prices or terms of trade, changes the present value of external debt as a proportion of GDP and affects the
capacity of the government and the private sector to service external debt obligations.  A technique for
simulating the impact of shocks on the costs of external indebtedness and the response of fiscal policies in
adjustment to such shocks is presented and applied to thirteen indebted Latin American countries.
The paper first extends the theoretical analysis of sustainable debt to allow for volatility.  The criterion
adopted for sustainability is based on the conventional solvency condition.  For public debt, this is that the
change in the expectation of the present value of future primary (that is, interest-exclusive) surpluses must equal
or exceed the change in the expectation of the present value of public debt service.  Both expectations are
conditional to the current shock.  The conditional expectation and present value calculations take account of the
future dynamics of the debt servicing costs and the fiscal balance following shocks, whether the shocks are
transitory or permanent.
An econometric model is used to calculate back-of-the-envelope simulations of the importance of
volatility and debt for the sample countries.  The expectation of the present value of the shock to debt servicing
costs conditional on a shock to world interest rates, oil prices or the non-oil terms of trade are calculated for2
each country.  This calculation is performed separately for total external debt and public external debt, both as
fractions of GDP and of public sector revenues.  The same is done for the response of the primary surplus
under past policies.  This is one way to simulate the endogenous adjustment of a given fiscal stance, but it is
unreliable as a measure of the adjustment of current fiscal stances for the Latin American countries because the
historical response to shocks includes significant changes of fiscal stance.
The simulations demonstrate the effect of indebtedness on the vulnerability of fiscal policies to
macroeconomic volatility.  They show that for several countries, current debt levels imply that past patterns of
fiscal policy responses cannot sustain public external debt in the face of interest rate and oil price shocks.  The
implication is that eventual fiscal contractions will be necessary to sustain external public debt against a standard
deviation shock to these variables.  
The impact of a 10% increase in the external debt-to-GDP ratio for each of the thirteen countries on
the expected present value of future debt service as a percentage of GDP is shown in Table I.  It shows, for
example, that Chile is the least sensitive country to the impact of world interest rate shocks on the cost of
external indebtedness, and for only six of the thirteen countries does a terms of trade improvement reduce the
cost of external indebtedness as a proportion of GDP.
The net effect of exogenous shocks on the expected present value of external debt less the expected
present value of the simulated historical primary surplus response is shown in Table II (Table 7 of the text). 
This table shows the expected present value conditional on a shock of the adjustment that must be met by
changes in fiscal policies inclusive of inflation tax increases.  It shows that a number of governments need to
undertake significant eventual changes in fiscal stance in response to exogenous shocks.  The first column for
each shock shows the net impact for total external debt of the country for the latest available year (1994) as a
percentage of GDP.  The second column shows the net impact for public external debt only (1994 level) as a
percentage of public sector revenues (1994).3
Table I
 Type of Shock:   Interest rate     Petroleum Price      Terms of Trade
Argentina 0.25  0.56  -0.07 
Bolivia 0.29  1.15  -0.02 
Brazil 0.02  0.33  -0.10 
Chile 0.52  0.92  0.23 
Colombia 0.27  0.58  -0.10 
Costa Rica 0.29  0.88  -0.21 
Ecuador 0.25  0.69  0.02 
Mexico 0.25  0.28  0.11 
Panama 0.89  0.59  0.27 
Paraguay 0.31  0.36  0.03 
Peru 0.44  0.23  0.28 
Uruguay 0.20  0.67  -0.05 
Venezuela 0.27  0.66  0.02 
Table II
Type of Shock:  Interest Rate        Petroleum Price       Terms of Trade
                 Total     Public       Total      Public      Total     Public
                 %GDP    %Revenues     %GDP     %Revenues     %GDP   %Revenues
Argentina 2.76  15.84  1.54  6.44  0.76  5.16 
Brazil -0.55  -2.00  2.44  7.36  -0.04  -1.11 
Chile 4.07  12.19  8.37  26.81  2.78  9.88 
Colombia 1.65  8.58  6.28  34.83  -0.93  -5.09 
Costa Rica 0.92  2.44  5.41  18.06  -0.90  -2.70 
Ecuador 1.31  2.95  8.07  27.03  0.08  -0.10 
Mexico 0.12  -1.15  3.14  16.86  0.88  4.50 
Panama 10.64  21.28  2.13  -2.94  2.20  2.81 
Paraguay 0.20  0.12  2.54  15.76  -0.01  -0.06 
Peru 2.33  13.62  2.16  14.88  2.40  16.25 
Uruguay -1.63  -6.21  5.79  16.40  6.92  23.10 
Venezuela 2.47  9.57  2.98  8.57  -0.59  -3.03 
The sensitivity of the estimates to changes in model specification and, especially, to changes in the base growth rates of real GDP and
interest rate spreads for each country were examined.  These estimates are very insensitive to changes in the growth rate and interest rate for all
countries to a tenth of one percent.  The paper does not perform a complete econometric analysis of the dynamics of past fiscal policy responses to
shocks for each country (notably, model specification has not been investigated).  Since policies have changed, often significantly, for several of these
countries, this is an interesting topic for further research. 4
Introduction
An important consideration in the evaluation of the viability of a current set of policies or the need for
policy reforms is whether the projected path for public sector debt or for external national debt is sustainable.
Standard back-of-the-envelope calculations of the sustainability of public sector deficit-finance focus on the
difference between the long-run expectation of the primary surplus and expectation of the debt service required
to maintain a constant outstanding public debt to output ratio.  Buiter [1983] labels this measure of the sustainability
of a particular set of fiscal, financial and monetary policies, the "permanent primary gap."  Blanchard [1990] and
Blanchard, et al [1990] propose a similar measure, the "primary gap," as a measure of fiscal stance over an arbitrary
horizon.  Similar calculations are applied to the evaluation of the sustainability of current account deficits and
external debt. 
While these simple long-run calculations are often very informative about the consequences of current
policies, the variables used are all subject to shocks that cause significant disturbances to real economic performance.
Under a given set of fiscal policies, outstanding public debt and the debt-servicing capacity of the public sector will
respond to these shocks.  For example, foreign macroeconomic shocks that increase world real interest rates or
cause a deterioration of a country's terms of trade tend to raise the cost of servicing external national debt (or both
external and internal public debt) and the socioeconomic costs of generating a given primary surplus.  When the
volatility of national incomes and present values of debt obligations are taken into account, the primary gap
measures implicitly assume that any macroeconomic disturbance is met by an adjustment of the sequence of primary
surpluses to maintain the given long-run debt-to-GDP ratio.  That is, a given debt ratio is sustainable by those
measures only if the present value of future public sector primary surpluses rises to match the increase in the present
value of the impact of the disturbance on the debt.  Without a compensating increase in the long-run expectation
of the primary surplus, expected outstanding debt will grow in response to a transitory negative macroeconomic
shock and, therefore, become unsustainable in the long run. 
The problem of assessing the sustainability of a given set of fiscal-financial policies of the public sector in
the presence of disturbances to real economic activity is especially important for the Latin American countries where
real growth rates have been much more volatile over cycles than in the industrialized countries.   This suggests that 1
measurements of the sustainability of fiscal policies and the public debt paths they generate should take account of
the magnitude of shocks to real debt-service obligations and to the capacity of the public sector to generate the net
resource transfers necessary to meet debt-service obligations.  A fiscal stance estimated to be sustainable in
expectation may not be when volatility in real economic activity and the response of the fiscal policies to shocks
are taken into account.
This paper proposes an approach for evaluating the riskiness of public debt for fiscal policies for a country
in an uncertain world economy.  The standard long-run debt-sustainability criterion is first used to motivate a
measure of how responsive fiscal policies must be to sustain debt levels against the historical impact of external
macroeconomic shocks on the domestic economy.  This measure gives an estimate of the present value of amount
by which the government must increase its domestic revenues net of expenditures over time following a shock.
The shocks can be either transitory or permanent.  The required adjustment for a given level of debt can then be
compared to the predicted cumulative (in discounted present value) adjustment of the primary surplus to the same
shock based on historical estimates.  To the extent that past fiscal policy responses capture the current fiscal stance,
this comparison can be used to determine if the current debt level can be sustained against shocks without changing
the tax and expenditure policies.  The procedure gives an estimate of the volatility of the present value of the
primary surplus needed to maintain external debt, or more generally, public debt, that can be used along with the
standard primary gap criterion to determine the debt ratio that is sustainable using current fiscal policies.
An approach for estimating the riskiness of public debt is demonstrated.  A straight-forward econometric
technique is used to form back-of-the-envelope estimates of the impact of world real interest rate, oil price and
terms of trade shocks on the real GDP growth rate and primary public sector surplus  for thirteen Latin American
countries.   For each country, the measure of riskiness of debt exposure is applied to foreign debt, rather than the 2
total of all public debt, to compare the volatility of external debt-service obligations to the response of public sector
revenues.  Because fluctuations in foreign debt-service obligations due to external shocks can be met by increasing
seignorage revenues or domestic public borrowing instead of increasing the primary surplus, another measure of
the historical response of domestic fiscal policies is also demonstrated.  This combines the primary surplus with






































than the accumulation of additional foreign debt.  Because of difficulties constructing such measures well, estimates
are only done for three countries as examples, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico.  These three countries also illustrate
the problem that past policy responses include changes in fiscal stance during times of crisis due to external
indebtedness and economic volatility. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 1 reviews the conventional solvency criterion and definition
of debt sustainability as background for the proposed measurements and analysis that follow.  In Section 2, the
approach for assessing the sustainability of fiscal policies against volatile real economic performance is explained
and discussed.  Section 3 describes the estimation and calculation procedure for making back-of-the-envelope
estimates of the riskiness of debt exposure and response of the fiscal balance to shocks.  Section 4 reports the results
for the thirteen Latin American countries.  The alternative calculations of the policy response to external debt are
also reported in Section 4 for Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico. Section 5 concludes. 
Government Solvency and Sustainable Debt
The public sector is said to be solvent if the face value of its outstanding debt does not exceed the present
discounted value of its  anticipated future revenues net of expenditures.  The single-period budget identity for the
combined public sector expressed in domestic currency units is given by: 
where D   and D  are foreign and domestic currency denominated debt outstanding at the beginning of period t+1 t+1
f d
t+1, respectively. e is the exchange rate (expressed in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency), i t t
f
is the foreign nominal interest rate, * is the proportional rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, i is the t t
domestic nominal interest rate, T is total taxes and fees net of transfers and subsidies of the public sector, G is t t
nominal government non-interest expenditure and H is base money outstanding at the beginning of period t. t
Rewriting this in terms of ratios to nominal GDP gives
where d is the total debt-to-GDP ratio, d  is the ratio of domestic currency denominated debt to GDP, g is the t t t
d
growth rate of real GDP, B is the domestic inflation rate.  s is the ratio of the primary surplus, the difference t t
between non-interest public sector revenues and non-interest public sector expenditures, to GDP, and F is t
seignorage defined as the change in base money divided by nominal GDP.  The term,
allows for departures from uncovered interest parity.
The solvency condition is obtained by solving the single-period budget identity for the public sector
forward over an infinite horizon.  Requiring that the face value of debt is no greater than the present discounted
value of planned future primary surpluses plus seignorage revenues gives an upper bound on the long-run growth
rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio.  This growth rate is given by (r-g)/(1+g), where r is the long-run domestic real rate
of interest and g is the long-run growth rate of real GDP.  To see this, we rewrite the single-period budget identity
assuming that uncovered interest parity holds ex post.  That is, 
so that dt%1 ’
(1%rt)
(1%gt)










































Solvency requires that the long-run debt-to-GDP ratio must satisfy the following condition:
Note that if the real exchange rate does not change in the long run, then r equals the foreign real rate of interest.
For a long-run real interest rate that exceeds the long-run growth rate of real GDP, this implies that the
debt-to-GDP ratio can be growing as part of a sustainable fiscal policy.  However, such a policy necessarily implies
that the ratio of the public sector primary surplus to GDP is growing.  A stronger, sufficient but not necessary,
condition for public sector solvency is that the debt-to-GDP ratio converge to a constant.  This is a useful
benchmark for assessing the sustainability of a public sector borrowing plan because it imposes the restriction that
public sector non-interest revenues cannot grow as a percentage of GDP without bound so that private
consumption, investment and government expenditures can remain positive fractions of GDP in the long run.  
The long-run condition for sustainability of a debt-to-GDP ratio, d, is given by
If long-run values are substituted for each of the parameters in equation (6), then the constant long-run ratio of the
sum of the primary surplus and seignorage revenues to GDP that sustains the given level of the debt-to-GDP ratio
is derived.  
This formula can be used to make a quick assessment of the implications of a projected debt-to-GDP ratio
for the average primary surplus if the public sector is to remain solvent.  For these purposes, the government is the
consolidated non-financial public sector and the central bank, and the debt is its non-monetary debt.  The primary
surplus-to-GDP ratio is the sum of the  primary surplus of the non-financial consolidated public sector and the
quasi-primary surplus-to-GDP ratio of the central bank.  
In the presence of international relative price and interest rate uncertainty, the cost to the domestic
economy of  servicing outstanding public debt is also uncertain.  Public debt can increase the impact of
macroeconomic volatility on domestic consumption and investment as the repayment stream necessary to maintain
solvency will fluctuate with shocks in proportion to the present value of the debt. 
The conventional solvency constraint can be written to allow for volatility.  The public sector is always
solvent if the conditional expectation of the present discounted value of future primary surpluses, inclusive of
seignorage revenues, equals the face value of the debt at every date.  This can be written as
where
is the discount factor applied to the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio generated at date j discounted to date t and is
a random variable. This relationship implies that solvency is maintained if an increase in the debt ratio is matched


























Volatility and Sustainable Policies
Solvency implies that adverse shocks to real interest rates or to real economic performance require
adjustments of the path of the augmented (inclusive of seignorage) primary surpluses of the public sector if there
is outstanding public debt.  The increase in the real debt-service obligations must eventually be repaid by generating
larger primary surpluses or more seignorage revenues.  Using the single-period budget identity, equation (4), and
imposing solvency yields the relationship:
where
is the discount factor between periods t and j.  This simply says that the expectation of the present value of the
increase in debt-service as a ratio of GDP that must be financed after a shock occurs in period t must be less than
or equal to the expected present value of the changes in the augmented primary surplus following the shock.  
An adverse shock to the real rate of interest or GDP growth rate, either transitory or permanent, at date
t raises the present value of the debt as a ratio of GDP.  Sustainability implies that the expectation of the present
value of the augmented primary surpluses conditional on the shock at date t must rise to match this increase.  This
holds whether the long-run debt ratio remains constant or permanently rises in response to the shock.  It is true
whether the augmented primary surplus rises each period following a shock to match the increase in debt-service
period-by-period (as for a debt-constrained government) or if the government borrows more to smooth the increase
in the augmented primary surplus over time.  The left-hand side of inequality (8) is a measure of how much
domestic absorption must adjust, in present value, to a macroeconomic disturbance for the public sector remain
solvent in all future dates.3
The effect of volatility on the sustainability of public sector debt paths under a given set of fiscal policies
can be estimated by using this inequality.  A dynamic empirical model of how exogenous macroeconomic shocks
affect real interest rates, real growth rates, primary surpluses and seignorage revenues can be used to generate the
effects of disturbances to the present values of the change in the augmented primary surplus and debt-servicing
requirement, the two sides of this inequality.  If fiscal surpluses do not adjust enough under the simulated policies
to offset the increase in the present value of public debt obligations, d, then the fiscal policy and outstanding public t
debt are not sustainable against that shock.  That is, the fiscal policies will need to change in response to the given
shock to sustain debt repayment.  This interpretation does not include contingent outright default as part of a given
fiscal stance.
The response of the primary surplus to world macroeconomic shocks combines two effects.  Public sector
revenues and expenditures respond passively to fluctuations in real economic variables, for example, through the
effects of shocks on the tax base.  The capacity of the government to transfer resources from the private sector for
the purpose of servicing public debt is effected by world interest rate, terms of trade and other shocks, and under
given tax and spending policies, the primary surplus will be endogenous to economic activity.  The primary surplus
can also respond because tax and spending policies are revised in the face of disturbances.  Similar statements hold
for monetary policies.  That is, any historical response to macroeconomic disturbances includes both endogenous
changes in the primary surplus under given policies and policy changes that are necessary when the previous policies
provide insufficient adjustments to shocks.
If a sequence of augmented primary surplus responses to exogenous shocks are produced under a
simulated policy using a structural model of the domestic economy, then an excess of the left-hand over the right-
hand side of equation (8) in response to a potential shock indicates that the fiscal policy is not sustainable under that
shock.  If, instead as in the analysis below, the response is taken from historical responses to exogenous shocks, then
the right-hand side measures the present value of the augmented primary surpluses that would be generated under
past policies.  If the past responsiveness of public revenues and expenditures to a simulated shock are too small,8
in present value, to offset the increase in debt service, then the analysis shows that the current stock of public debt
cannot be sustained in the face of volatility by pursuing past fiscal policies without resorting to monetization.
The solvency analysis can applied to estimating the impact of economic volatility on fiscal policies in a
number of ways.  The estimated consequences of disturbances to debt-service obligations (the left-hand side of (8))
for the current outstanding stock of public debt can be compared to the responsiveness of the primary surplus or
its components, revenues and spending.  Alternatively, an informative comparison can be made between public
sector revenues and the volatility of debt obligations by calculating the volatility of debt servicing as a ratio of public
sector revenue rather than GDP.  This number gives the percentage increase in tax revenues necessary to sustain
public expenditures and solvency after a shock.
Different types of public debt may carry different explicit or implicit terms of payment, complicating the
calculation of the volatility of public debt service.  Even if the total level of public debt is a properly calculated
present value discounted at the real interest rate faced by the government for issuing additional debt, the change
in the interest rate charged on different types of debt in response to a shock can differ.  For example, domestic debt
may be nominally-indexed to the domestic currency, so that the inflation tax on outstanding public debt should be
taken into account if the monetary policy response to a shock is included endogenously.  External debt can carry
fixed or variable interest terms (this problem is discussed in the next section).
This approach for estimating the interaction between indebtedness and volatility is applied to external debt
separately below.  The response of the present value of the primary surplus to macroeconomic shocks is estimated.
This number gives the effect of the shock on public sector revenues net of expenditures under past policies.
Possible policy responses to shocks to real external debt-servicing obligations also include additional domestic
borrowing and inflation taxation.  The difference between the impact of the shock to the burden of external debt
and the primary surplus, exclusive of seignorage, equals the increase in seignorage revenues or additional domestic
public borrowing that must occur to sustain current external indebtedness under the simulated tax and spending
policies.  An alternative way to study past policy responses is to calculate an “external primary surplus” which
includes seignorage and domestic borrowing.  This is illustrated at the end of Section 4.  These calculations
endogenize all ways in which domestic resources have been used to finance external debt obligations in the face of
volatility, so that they include revisions of fiscal and monetary policies.
Estimating the Impact of Volatility on the Sustainability of Public Debt
A simple dynamic econometric model is used to estimate the impact of volatility on debt and fiscal
balances.  The procedure begins by estimating the stochastic process for world real interest rates and oil prices,
variables that are exogenous to the country, using a vector autoregressive model.  The world real rate of interest is
calculated from the nominal 3-month LIBOR using average U.S. CPI inflation for the previous 12 months as a
measure of expected inflation.  Real interest rates are correlated with both lagged real interest rates and lagged world
oil prices.  Lagged values of the real interest rate are also included in the regressions for the oil price. 
Three variables are used to characterize the domestic economy's response to shocks:  the terms of trade,
the real GDP growth rate and the primary surplus as a fraction of GDP.  The primary surplus and growth rate are
used in the calculations of sustainability, while the terms of trade serve as one source of shocks.  The terms of trade
are estimated as functions of lagged values of world real interest rates, oil prices and the terms of trade, but not on
other country-specific variables, such as the domestic growth rate, to be consistent with a small open-economy
assumption.  The impact of the terms of trade on real GDP growth and the public sector primary surplus, therefore,
is the impact holding constant the deflated world oil price, so that the separate terms of trade shock is only the
portion of terms of trade shocks unexplained by world oil price shocks.
Two approaches can be taken for specifying the dynamics of the growth rate of real GDP and the primary
surplus.  In one, real GDP depends on lagged values of world real interest rates, oil prices, the terms of trade, itself
and the primary surplus to reflect the potential effects of fiscal policies on output.  In the other, real GDP growth
is taken as exogenous to the primary surplus.  This is done because past fiscal policies may depart significantly from

























side of equation (8) endogenizes the estimation of the impact of exogenous shocks on fiscal adjustment to these
past policy responses.  Neither approach is fully satisfactory.  The actual regressions are set up to demonstrate a
simple “back-of-the-envelope” procedure, so that the real GDP growth rate is used directly in place of real GDP.
A time trend is included for the terms of trade, GDP growth rate and primary surplus in the primary version of the
model, which excludes feedbacks of the primary surplus on real GDP growth.  This model is estimated as an
autoregression (restricted VAR) in the five variables with coefficient restrictions imposed to reflect the exogeneity
assumptions just described.
The real interest rate is calculated by averaging the monthly real interest rate over each year.  The oil price
is the US dollar price reported in the IMF International Financial Statistics, deflated by the US consumer price
index.  Real GDP growth is taken from the IDB data base, the terms of trade index from the World Tables of the
World Bank, and the primary surplus of the non-financial consolidated public sector series was constructed by the
IDB (Gavin, et al [1996]).  The quasi-fiscal surplus for the central bank is not included due to data unavailability.
Annual data from 1970 to 1995, inclusive, are used as availability permitted.  Debt data are taken from the World
Bank World Debt Tables.
Interest rates and the price of oil are modelled by the following pair of equations:
The presence of a unit root is rejected for the real interest rate series, while the estimated equations for the deflated
world oil price and terms of trade for the individual countries are mean regressive but unit roots are not necessarily
rejected for all.
Estimation of equations (9) and (10) using OLS for observations on the dependent variable from 1970 to















































































r = 0.326 + 0.652 r  - 0.224 r  - 0.096 p  + 0.140 p t t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2
    (0.804) (0.137)    (0.170)     (0.039)     (0.038)
Standard error of estimate = 1.638
R      = 0.8393
2
R-bar  = 0.5792
2
p = 8.455 + 1.357 r  - 1.838 r  + 0.888 p  - 0.120 p t t-1 t-2 t-1 t-2
    (4.228) (0.902)     (0.894)    (0.205)     (0.202)
Standard error of estimate = 8.611
R      = 0.9461
2
R-bar  = 0.6508
2
(standard errors in parentheses)
The sample mean of the real interest rate is 2.66% with a standard deviation of 2.53%.  The real 3-month
Eurodollar rate of interest is graphed in Figure 1. The sample mean deflated oil price was $29.75 with a standard
deviation of $14.57.
The rest of the basic system for each country is given by
where q is the terms of trade for the country.  The model equation for the public sector primary surplus is just a
basic specification.  Alternative specifications might allow for possible policy reactions by including variables such
as the operational budget surplus to allow for endogenous increases in taxes or reductions in expenditures as debt-
servicing costs rise.  
The regression results for the individual country equations are reported in the Appendix. 
The impact of exogenous shocks to the world real interest rate, petroleum price and terms of trade on the
debt-service requirement and the primary surplus are calculated using the simulated impulse response for each of
the five variables .  The impulse response calculates the predicted value for each dependent variable using the 4
estimated equation system when the initial value of one of the variables is increased by one standard deviation of
its  estimate.  For each shock, the present values of the change in debt-service and the primary surplus as fractions







































and r  (g ) is the base interest rate (growth rate) and )r ()g)is the change in the real interest rate (growth rate) at 0 0 j j
date t+j for the date t impulse.  Equations (11) and (12) approximate the two sides of equation (8) since the
simulated expected values for the interest and growth rates appear in denominators.  Because the variation in (1+r)
and (1+g) is small, the difference is negligible for these data.
Equation (11) gives the expected present value of the increase in the primary surplus necessary to sustain
the current level of debt, d, in response to a one standard deviation exogenous shock at date t.  It does not just give t
the first period effect, but accounts for subsequent dynamics.  The effects of shocks to the foreign real interest rate,
oil price and terms of trade diminish over time in the data sample, so that the calculated present value is an estimate
of the conditional expectation of the full discounted cost of adjustment to the shock.  That is, a shock to the real
interest rate is transitory but persists so that the calculation takes into account the expected deviation of future
interest rates from the long-run rate conditioned on the disturbance at date t.  Equation (12) gives the expected
present value of the simulated response of the primary surplus under past policies to a shock.  The primary surplus
may respond permanently to a transitory shock, as in a neoclassical model of tax-smoothing.  
The calculation of the impact of exogenous shocks on fiscal adjustment requires values of the base growth
rate, interest rate and debt level.  The interest rate must include the premium on national borrowing on international
financial markets over the real interest rate simulated.  This is calculated as an average over five years using the most
recent available values for average interest rate on all new commitments from the World Bank World Debt Tables
minus nominal 3-month LIBOR.  The average difference is used as the expected interest differential for each
country.  This is smaller for countries with large shares of official creditor and concessional debt.  The base growth
rate for each country is also calculated as a five-year average using the latest available dates, as is the base world real
interest rate.   The five-year average world real interest rate is 2.6%, while the steady-state interest rate for the 5
estimated interest rate and oil price VAR is 2.9%; this difference has a very small effect on the present value
calculations.  The robustness of the calculations to different base growth and interest rates is discussed below. 
Both total external debt and public external debt as reported in the World Debt Tables are used.  Because
private external debt carries explicit and implicit public guarantees, it is unclear where between these two values to
place the present value of debt burden of the public sector so calculations for both are simply reported.6
Treatment of Fixed Rate Debt
The treatment of floating and fixed rate debt also matters.  Suppose that an equal share of fixed rate debt
is refinanced each year with maturity constant and equal to T.  At date t, 1/T of the outstanding fixed rate debt is
refinanced at the interest rate r for T periods.  The change in the present value of the debt service for this new fixed t
rate debt is given by
Similarly, the shock at date t affects the interest rate at date t+1 which is incorporated into the fixed rate contract
for the 1/T fraction of the outstanding total fixed rate debt refinanced at date t+1.  The present discounted value































This expression is a bit difficult to untangle but can be simplified by rearranging the summations, discounting over
the life of each portion of the fixed rate debt at the base interest and growth rates and approximating
for each k = j, ..., j+T-1.  That is, deflate the interest shock for each portion of the fixed-rate debt at just one growth
rate; this is a very minor approximation for the estimated shocks.  This gives
This expression is just the present value of the effect of the shock for variable rate debt multiplied by the factor
which equals one for T=1 and declines as T grows for r  > g .  For an initial maturity on fixed rate debt of 7 years 0 0
this equals 94% for a difference between the real rate of interest and real GDP growth rate of 2% and 97% for a
difference of 1%.  As the maturity rises to 10 years, these fall to 92% and 96%, respectively.  That is, the present
value of the full impact of a shock at date t to fixed rate debt is approximately 95% or more of what it would be
for an equal present value amount of variable rate debt for the Latin American countries. 
Fixed rate and variable rate debt interest terms may also differ.  The World Debt Tables does not report
separate average interest rates on new commitments by maturity, so that the average interest spread for each country
applies to the sum of fixed and variable rate debt.
An approximate correction for fixed versus floating rate debt would reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio used
by the fraction of fixed rate debt in the total times 0.05.  This difference is certainly smaller than the error of the
estimated shock for all countries.  In the calculations of the expectation of the impact of shocks on debt-servicing
costs, fixed rate and variable rate debt are treated the same.  13
Adjustment Costs of External and Public Debt for 13 Latin American 
Countries




        Total External        Public External          Public Revenues       Real GDP                 
Interest
                 Debt  (%GDP)        Debt  (%GDP)          (%GDP)     Growth Rate           Rate
Spread    
Argentina 33.50  24.45  16.02  6.16  2.26 
Bolivia  88.22  76.54  14.00  4.23  -1.20 
Brazil 31.24  21.29  28.69  0.90  2.60 
Chile 52.36  25.76  22.09  6.38  1.18 
Colombia 38.06  30.02  16.69  4.24  1.86 
Costa Rica 60.76  49.50  24.49  4.87  1.54 
Ecuador 107.08  82.03  23.50  3.59  1.10 
Mexico 37.44  24.80  16.55  3.20  2.04 
Panama 118.56  68.00  28.97  6.33  1.36 
Paraguay 29.06  23.07  14.73  2.91  0.14 
Peru 61.80  46.47  12.12  2.90  1.18 
Uruguay 41.34  28.88  30.24  4.31  1.72 
Venezuela 65.72  47.71  20.79  3.94  1.90 
Table 2 compares the present values of the expectation of the impact of exogenous world interest rate
shocks on the cost of maintaining solvency across the thirteen countries.  It shows the expected adjustment
necessary for a one-standard deviation shock to the US real rate of interest for a common debt-to-GDP ratio equal
to one hundred percent.  These values can be used to compare how much a given increase in outstanding debt, for
example, an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of 1%, increases the risk of having to adjust future fiscal policies to
shocks across countries.
Table 2
      model 1       model 2       model 3
Argentina 3.37  2.47  3.85 
Bolivia 3.05  2.88  NR 
Brazil -5.46  0.21  -0.12 
Chile 5.20  5.19  5.15 
Colombia 3.04  2.72  3.04 
Costa Rica 2.27  2.88  2.09 
Ecuador 3.07  2.45  2.36 
Mexico 1.69  2.48  2.26 
Panama 8.03  8.85  8.87 
Paraguay 2.84  3.11  2.32 
Peru -2.11  4.43  2.97 
Uruguay 2.31  1.99  1.04 
Venezuela 2.84  2.70  1.31 14
The table displays the results for three models.  The first is the base model described above.  In the second,
time trends are included in the equations for the terms of trade, growth rate and primary surplus.  The trends may
improve the fit of the equations to the data in the absence of adding more lagged dependent variables because of
the short data sample, but are not included on the basis of tests for stochastic trends.  The third series is for a model
in which two lagged values of the primary surplus are included in the regression equation for the real growth rate
of GDP.  The estimate for Bolivia is not reported because the value of the Bolivian primary surplus in the data set
for one year appears to be grossly distorted by the effect of the hyperinflation of the early 1980's on national
accounts.
The estimated impact of an interest rate shock on the present value of debt payments for a debt-to-GDP
ratio equal to one shows sizable differences under the alternative models for two countries, Brazil and Peru.  After
multiplying by actual debt-to-GDP ratios, the differences for most countries diminish.  The version with trends
included is used for the remainder of the comparisons.
Robustness with respect to changes in the base growth rate of real GDP is illustrated in Table 3; results for
changes in the interest spread over LIBOR are very similar.  Table 3 compares the expected present value
adjustment cost for all external debt due to an interest rate shock for each country for a common interest spread
equal to 2% (real interest rate of 4.6%) for different rates of growth (g) with the calculated simulation value.
Table 3
g=2 g=3 g=4 g=5 simulation
Argentina 0.91  0.90  0.88  0.85  0.83 
Bolivia 2.68  2.68  2.69  2.69  2.54 
Brazil 0.05  0.03  0.01  -0.01  0.06 
Chile 2.86  2.84  2.80  2.77  2.72 
Colombia 1.03  1.03  1.04  1.04  1.04 
Costa Rica 1.75  1.75  1.75  1.75  1.75 
Ecuador 2.66  2.64  2.61  2.59  2.62 
Mexico 0.94  0.93  0.92  0.91  0.93 
Panama 9.95  10.07  10.20  10.32  10.50 
Paraguay 0.91  0.90  0.90  0.89  0.90 
Peru 2.76  2.73  2.71  2.68  2.74 
Uruguay 0.89  0.86  0.83  0.80  0.82 
Venezuela 1.87  1.82  1.77  1.72  1.77 
The simulated impact of a world interest rate shock for each country is reported in Table 4.  The table first
shows the total expected present value cost of the shock attributable to foreign debt exposure as a percentage of
GDP for both total external debt and public sector external debt.  It next shows the same costs as percentages of
public sector revenues.  The last column shows the expected present value of the simulated response of the primary
surplus to the same shock.
Table 4 allows a comparison of the adjustment of public sector revenues and expenditures to an interest
rate shock under past policies to the adjustment required to maintain solvency.  An excess of the amount shown
in column 1 (column 2, depending on the nature of public sector liabilities associated with private foreign15
borrowing) over that shown in column 5 implies that further policy adjustment will be necessary in the event of a
shock.  This can take the form of monetization, domestic public borrowing, eventual default or a change of fiscal
stance.
Table 4
                    Total External Debt          Public External Debt  Primary
Surplus
                 %GDP              %Revenue             %GDP          %Revenue                   
%GDP
Argentina 0.83  5.17  0.60  3.77  -1.93 
Bolivia 2.54  18.13  2.20  15.73  NR  
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Brazil 0.06  0.22  0.04  0.15  0.62 
Chile 2.72  12.30  1.34  6.05  -1.36 
Colombia 1.04  6.21  0.82  4.90  -0.62 
Costa Rica 1.75  7.14  1.42  5.81  0.82 
Ecuador 2.62  11.17  2.01  8.55  1.32 
Mexico 0.93  5.61  0.61  3.71  0.81 
Panama 10.50  36.23  6.02  20.78  -0.14 
Paraguay 0.90  6.13  0.72  4.87  0.70 
Peru 2.74  22.57  2.06  16.97  0.41 
Uruguay 0.82  2.72  0.57  1.90  2.45 
Venezuela 1.77  8.53  1.29  6.19  -0.70 
The table shows that an adverse interest rate shock leads to an increase in the present value of outstanding
debt for Mexico, for example, of 0.9% of GDP and a present value increase in the primary surplus of 0.8%.  This
leaves a point estimate gap of 0.1% of GDP which is equivalent to a small rise in annual seignorage revenues.
Negative estimates of the response of the primary surplus in present value indicate that the primary deficit rises in
response to an adverse interest rate shock and decreases with a favorable shock.  Both Tables 2 and 4 show that
Panama is particularly sensitive to shocks.  Table 2 shows this controlling for the outstanding debt level.  The rate
of real GDP growth for Panama is comparably volatile.8
Most of the countries display an increase in primary surpluses in response to world interest rate shocks that
increase the present value of outstanding debt.  At a glance this appears to be consistent with countercyclical fiscal
policy.  However, positive interest rate shocks are correlated with transitory reductions in real GDP growth, so that
these fiscal policy stances are actually contractionary and therefore, procyclical.
Table 5 displays similar estimates for world petroleum price shocks. 16
Table 5
                    Total External Debt          Public External Debt  Primary
Surplus
                             %GDP              %Revenue                 %GDP                 %Revenue               
%GDP
Argentina 1.89  11.79  1.38  8.61  0.35 
Bolivia  10.16  72.60  8.82  62.99  NR 
Brazil 1.03  3.60  0.70  2.45  -1.41 
Chile 4.83  21.86  2.38  10.76  -3.55 
Colombia 2.20  13.17  1.73  10.39  -4.08 
Costa Rica 5.33  21.77  4.34  17.74  -0.08 
Ecuador 7.35  31.28  5.63  23.96  -0.72 
Mexico 1.04  6.30  0.69  4.17  -2.10 
Panama 6.99  24.13  4.01  13.84  4.86 
Paraguay 1.05  7.10  0.83  5.64  -1.49 
Peru 1.45  11.94  1.09  8.98  -0.72 
Uruguay 2.77  9.17  1.94  6.41  -3.02 
Venezuela 4.37  21.01  3.17  15.25  1.39 
This table shows that world oil price shocks have greater effects on the costs of current indebtedness than
do world interest rate shocks.  The impact of a shock on the present value of external public debt as a fraction of
public sector revenues for seven of the thirteen countries exceeds 10 percent.  For Bolivia, a world oil price shock
raises the present value of public external debt by 63 percent of revenues; for Ecuador, it is estimated to be 24
percent. For the majority of the countries, without a pattern with respect to oil importing or exporting countries,
a positive shock in the real US price of oil raises the primary deficit of the public sector.
Table 6 displays the response to terms of trade shocks, holding constant the deflated world oil price for
each country. A terms of trade shock is an improvement in the country’s terms of trade.  A favorable shock leads
to a net present value increase in the public sector primary deficit of between 0.5 and 5 percent of GDP for five
of twelve countries.  It also leads to increases in the present value of outstanding debt for six of thirteen countries.
  Table 6
                    Total External Debt          Public External Debt  Primary
Surplus
                            %GDP               %Revenue         %GDP          %Revenue                 
%GDP
Argentina -0.23  -1.46  -0.17  -1.06  -1.00 
Bolivia  -0.21  -1.49  -0.18  -1.29  NR 
Brazil -0.31  -1.06  -0.21  -0.72  0.11 
Chile 1.18  5.35  0.58  2.63  -1.60 
Colombia -0.38  -2.30  -0.30  -1.81  0.55 
Costa Rica -1.29  -5.29  -1.05  -4.31  -0.39 
Ecuador 0.24  1.04  0.19  0.79  0.16 
Mexico 0.41  2.49  0.27  1.65  -0.47 
Panama 3.26  11.24  1.87  6.45  1.05 
Paraguay 0.08  0.56  0.06  0.44  0.07 
Peru 1.74  14.37  1.31  10.81  -0.66 
Uruguay -0.22  -0.72  -0.15  -0.50  -7.14 17
Venezuela 0.16  0.75  0.11  0.54  0.74 18
Net Adjustment to Shocks
Each of the simulations of the expected cost of a shock provides an estimate of the net amount of
adjustment to each shock that would be necessary under past fiscal policy responses to shocks in present value after
taking account of changes in public sector taxes net of transfers and expenditures.  Table 7 presents these estimates
which are calculated by subtracting the present value change in the primary surplus from the present value change
in debt-servicing costs.  The first column for each type of shock gives the required adjustment net of the primary
surplus response for the total of external debt as a percentage of GDP, and the second gives the net adjustment for
public external debt alone as a percentage of public sector revenues.
Several interesting observations can be made from Table 7.  The simulations imply that six countries,
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, would require significant adjustments of their past fiscal
stances in response to a world interest rate shock as shares of public sector revenues.  However, for Argentina,
Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, increases in inflation tax revenues of up to 2 percent of GDP could provide
the increase in public sector revenues needed to sustain current levels of public external debt.  For Panama, the
shortfall is very large and changes in seignorage revenues are restricted by the peg of the balboa to the US dollar.
The simulations imply that Brazil and Uruguay can more than sustain their current external debt using past fiscal
policy responses without resort to inflation taxes.
  Table 7 
Type of Shock:         Interest Rate                     Petroleum Price                            Terms of
Trade
                 Total            Public                Total              Public           Total      Public
                             %GDP        %Revenues              %GDP        %Revenues              %GDP         
%Revenues
Argentina 2.76  15.84  1.54  6.44  0.76  5.16 
Brazil -0.55  -2.00  2.44  7.36  -0.04  -1.11 
Chile 4.07  12.19  8.37  26.81  2.78  9.88 
Colombia 1.65  8.58  6.28  34.83  -0.93  -5.09 
Costa Rica 0.92  2.44  5.41  18.06  -0.90  -2.70 
Ecuador 1.31  2.95  8.07  27.03  0.08  -0.10 
Mexico 0.12  -1.15  3.14  16.86  0.88  4.50 
Panama 10.64  21.28  2.13  -2.94  2.20  2.81 
Paraguay 0.20  0.12  2.54  15.76  -0.01  -0.06 
Peru 2.33  13.62  2.16  14.88  2.40  16.25 
Uruguay -1.63  -6.21  5.79  16.40  6.92  23.10 
Venezuela 2.47  9.57  2.98  8.57  -0.59  -3.03 
World oil price shocks have a small impact on Argentina, but fiscal policies would need to adjust, under
the simulation, for Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Uruguay even allowing for significant seignorage
revenue increases.  Oil price shocks have a small effect on Panama, while for most countries they are a greater
source of fiscal concern than foreign interest rate shocks.
Adverse terms of trade shocks other than petroleum price shocks do not appear to require significant fiscal
adjustments for all countries.  Positive non-oil terms of trade shocks do increase the net adjustment for the publicd ( ’ ( 1%g (
r (&g ()s (,
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sector (public debt-servicing impact as a share of revenues) for Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Peru and
Uruguay.
Simulating Other Fiscal Policy Responses
In addition to increasing taxes or reducing expenditures to meet positive shocks to external debt service,
governments can increase inflation taxes or borrow domestically.  The behavior of the sum of the primary surplus,
seignorage revenues and domestic public borrowing is a broader measure of the historical fiscal response to the
impact of exogenous shocks on debt-servicing.  The model was re-estimated and the simulations calculated for three
countries that have pursued rather different fiscal policies and for which this model performs well.  These are
Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico.  Seignorage was calculated using the change in reserve money reported by the IMF
International Financial Statistics, and domestic borrowing the difference between the interest-inclusive public sector
budget deficit (IFS) minus foreign interest payments (World Bank World Debt Tables).  Table 8 reports the present
value of the response of this invented “external augmented surplus” and compares it to the response of the primary
surplus for these countries, both as percentages of GDP.
Table 8
Surplus:  “External”  Primary
Type of Shock:          Interest Rate                       Petroleum Price                    Terms of
Trade
Colombia -2.50 -0.62 -4.69 -4.08 1.03 0.55
Ecuador 0.74 1.32 -7.40 -0.72 -0.28 0.16
Mexico -3.57 0.81 -6.38 -2.10 1.91 -0.47
This table reveals that the addition of the simulated responses of seignorage and domestic public borrowing
exacerbates the insufficiency of the response of fiscal policies to exogenous shocks to the present real value of
external debt except for the case of the Colombian and Mexican responses to terms of trade shocks.  The separate
time series behavior of seignorage revenues, tax revenues and public sector expenditures to these shocks would
make an interesting extension of the study of the fiscal adjustment of indebted countries.
Comparison with Primary Gaps Estimates
The empirical model in the version without time trends can be used to compare the expected long-run
present value of the primary surplus for each country.  This is done by finding the steady-state solution of the
estimated model and calculating the sustainable level of external debt as 
where * indicate the model steady-state values for the growth rate, interest rate and primary surplus.  For example,
the implied debt-to-GDP ratio that is sustainable is 22% for Argentina, 95% for Mexico and 98% for Colombia.
However, these simulations are very sensitive to changes in the growth rate.  For example, lowering the growth rate
for each of these countries by 1% reduces the estimated long-run sustainable debt level to 17%, 36% and 60%,
respectively.  The estimates of the volatility of external debt obligations and the expected change in the present value
of the primary surplus are much less sensitive to changes in the assumed base growth rate of GDP as shown in20
Table 3.
Conclusion 
The results reported in Tables 4 through 7 indicate the importance of exogenous shocks combined with
external debt exposure for fiscal policies in Latin America.  For most countries (with the exceptions of Panama and
Peru), oil price shocks have larger impacts on the expected present value of external debt as a proportion of GDP,
than do world interest rate shocks.  Non-oil terms of trade shocks tend to have smaller effects than either interest
rate or oil price shocks.
At current debt levels, three countries, Bolivia, Panama and Peru face a potential increase in the real present
value of external public debt of at least 15% of public sector revenues for interest rate shocks.  For oil price shocks,
the potential fiscal adjustment necessary, in present value, for Bolivia exceeds 60% of public revenues.  For six other
countries, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela, the impact of an oil price shock due to
public debt exceeds 10% of public revenues.  These estimates indicate that exogenous shocks have significant
impacts on fiscal policy adjustment and viability.  The country with the highest external debt-to-GDP ratio, Panama,
also faces a potential interest rate shock to the present value of debt as a fraction of GDP of 10% of GDP.  This
is a dramatic measure of the riskiness of high indebtedness.
Table 7 adjusts these volatility estimates for simulated historical responses of fiscal policies to the same
shocks.  It reveals that for most of the countries adverse shocks to world interest rates and oil prices will require
a change in fiscal stance or sizable increases in inflation taxes.  The estimates also show that the oil shocks tend to
increase public sector primary deficits for all but Panama and Venezuela (the impact for Costa Rica is negligible)
in addition to increasing the costs of debt-service for all.  For most countries, non-oil terms of trade improvements
increase deficits so that adverse terms of trade shocks create the least concern for fiscal policy adjustment.
The sensitivity of the simulated estimates to the assumed base rates of real GDP growth and interest rate
spreads is shown in Table 3.  The simulations are very insensitive to these changes, which is comforting and
contrasts sharply with the primary gaps procedure for the sustainability of public debt in long-run expectation.21
1.  Gavin, et al [1996] find that the average cumulative change in real GDP
during major recessions of the past 25 years has been -10.7% for Latin
American compared to -3.3% for the OECD countries.
2.  These are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.  The time
period for the estimation is 1970-1996, although the data series for some
countries are shorter.
3.  That is, if the public debt is sustainable before the shock in
expectation, then the expression measures the required adjustment for the
public sector to remain solvent in expectation after the shock.
4. The simulated primary surplus reported in this paper is calculated over an
infinite horizon using long-run averages for the growth rate and interest
rate.  Because the growth rates and terms of trade for each country and the
interest rate converge rapidly, the shock to debt-service reported in the
tables is calculated from from a ten-period simulation (adding more years and
discounting using historical long-run growth and interest rates does not
affect the simulated values to the reported number of decimal places.
5. The recent average value of each country’s real growth rate is used for
ten-periods to capture short-run dynamics due to a contemporary shock. 
However, a commoon average long-run rate of 3% is used for discounting beyond
the first ten-periods of the simulation.  The calculations are robust to
changes in this growth rate between 2 and 4 percent as reported.   
6.  The external public debt of several Latin American countries includes a
portion that is grant.  This component does not affect the calculations
performed in this paper, since even if debt carries a concessionary interest-
rate spread, the cost of debt servicing as a fraction of GDP is subject to the
same size shock to world interest rates or international prices.  The grant
element would affect a “primary gaps” estimation, but the not the riskiness
estimation. 
7.  The simulated value for the Bolivian primary surplus is not reported
because the estimated model is explosive.  This is attributable to a value for
the primary surplus in the data set available to the author that is not
credible for 1984 followed by unavailable data for 1985.  Reestimation
deleting the 1984 data will eliminate the unstable dynamics.
8. A hypothesis is that the US invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989 could
contribute to this estimate and a dummy variable should be introduced to
accont for this event.  However, the GDP growth rate drops dramatically in
1988 (it is -16%) not 1990.
Endnotes22
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Appendix
Estimated Equations for Each Country
Table A.1
Dependent variable: Terms of Trade
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador
   Variable
Constant 108.4131  71.2053  133.4054  132.3814  268.8094  217.8650  70.2786 
48.8154  34.6366  69.4799  39.2251  108.7344  68.5433  13.4604 
Trend -1.5507  -1.2011  -2.1337  -1.5877  -5.0801  -2.6875  0.2096 
0.8627  0.7494  0.9667  0.6986  2.2696  1.0399  0.4801 
Interest rate(-1)  -0.6600  1.9742  -0.3521  -0.6456  3.5102  1.2437  3.1608 
1.3207  2.3591  1.1070  1.2665  3.5446  1.6181  1.0819 
Interest rate(-2) 0.4527  -2.0324  2.1048  0.3903  -1.2788  -2.3438  -0.3145 
1.1083  2.5475  1.0976  1.0489  2.3846  1.4069  1.1864 
Oil price(-1) 0.0196  1.2551  -0.2067  -0.5522  -0.0295  -0.0496  1.6967 
0.2611  0.8293  0.2269  0.2196  0.6671  0.3509  0.4397 
Oil price(-2) -0.4576  -0.4571  -0.2010  -0.1328  -0.2001  -0.1335  0.8953 
0.2682  0.8144  0.2354  0.2709  0.6368  0.2833  0.5169 
Terms of Trade(-1) 0.9827  0.1679  0.0073  0.5693  0.1616  -0.0204  -0.5520 
0.2120  0.3704  0.2645  0.1873  0.2954  0.2600  0.2824 
Terms of trade(-2) -0.3944  0.2362  0.3170  -0.1932  -0.3500  -0.2786  0.0055 
0.2416  0.3749  0.2669  0.1676  0.3155  0.2775  0.2182 
R-squared 0.9965  0.9800  0.9968  0.9969  0.9825  0.9937  0.9950 
Standard errors in italics24
Table A.1 (continued)
Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
   Variable
Constant 90.9052  111.6184  176.7156  197.6419  95.6310  41.1655 
25.4069  36.2279  47.6748  52.9689  20.3829  18.0566 
Trend -0.6586  -1.0016  -1.7540  -3.4642  -0.0161  -0.1190 
0.4152  0.4045  0.5630  0.9415  0.3529  0.7092 
Interest rate(-1)  2.2938  -0.0336  -2.1021  -1.4576  -1.3896  4.4737 
1.3724  0.7607  1.0002  1.5322  0.9314  2.1397 
Interest rate(-2) -1.8053  0.4611  0.4647  0.7794  -0.2102  -2.5764 
1.3799  0.6818  1.0453  1.0950  0.9224  2.2131 
Oil price(-1) 1.1060  0.6092  -0.2259  -0.3789  -0.0243  2.0495 
0.4652  0.1759  0.2247  0.2466  0.1707  0.7528 
Oil price(-2) 0.3914  0.0332  -0.1165  -0.0758  -0.2643  1.0396 
0.5674  0.2560  0.2434  0.2682  0.1799  0.9068 
Terms of Trade(-1) 0.0369  0.1851  0.4597  0.8420  0.4999  -0.0809 
0.3044  0.2596  0.2335  0.2210  0.0970  0.3267 
Terms of trade(-2) -0.0913  -0.2287  -0.4133  -0.6098  -0.2696  -0.1115 
0.2716  0.2121  0.2061  0.2817  0.0997  0.2646 
R-squared 0.9917  0.9987  0.9967  0.9968  0.9981  0.9826 25
Table A. 2
Dependent variable: Real GDP Growth Rate
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador
   Variable     
Constant -0.0022  0.0462  0.1545  0.6369  -0.1330  -0.2756  0.2894 
0.2489  0.0508  0.4373  0.1961  0.0710  0.2950  0.0891 
Trend 0.0019  0.0005  -0.0057  -0.0080  0.0040  0.0052  -0.0049 
0.0044  0.0008  0.0056  0.0037  0.0016  0.0045  0.0017 
Interest rate(-1)  -0.0057  -0.0052  0.0013  -0.0276  -0.0060  -0.0102  -0.0001 
0.0071  0.0026  0.0068  0.0065  0.0024  0.0062  0.0031 
Interest rate(-2) 0.0004  0.0030  0.0026  0.0115  0.0003  0.0063  -0.0027 
0.0058  0.0025  0.0062  0.0060  0.0015  0.0050  0.0032 
Oil price(-1) -0.0009  -0.0010  -0.0005  -0.0008  0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0013 
0.0013  0.0008  0.0013  0.0012  0.0005  0.0012  0.0013 
Oil price(-2) -0.0002  -0.0011  -0.0003  -0.0014  -0.0010  -0.0018  -0.0011 
0.0014  0.0008  0.0013  0.0015  0.0005  0.0015  0.0017 
Terms of Trade(-1) -0.0000  0.0006  0.0007  0.0016  0.0007  0.0016  0.0014 
0.0012  0.0004  0.0017  0.0009  0.0002  0.0011  0.0008 
Terms of trade(-2) 0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0039  0.0004  0.0011  -0.0015 
0.0013  0.0004  0.0016  0.0008  0.0003  0.0011  0.0007 
GDP Growth(-1) -0.1296  0.1008  -0.0495  0.1891  -0.2740  -0.0972  -0.3496 
0.2756  0.2686  0.3064  0.1914  0.2648  0.3604  0.1888 
GDP Growth(-2) -0.3866  0.0280  -0.1211  -0.0524  -0.1780  -0.8217  -0.4478 
0.3014  0.2179  0.3298  0.1518  0.2033  0.3858  0.1637 
R-squared  0.3459  0.9000  0.7370  0.8490  0.9702  0.8381  0.8685 26
Table A. 2 (continued)
Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
   Variable
Constant 0.3129  1.1343  0.1530  0.4289  0.1605  0.1172 
0.0900  0.4041  0.1396  0.4558  0.1270  0.0592 
Trend -0.0042  -0.0041  -0.0020  -0.0092  -0.0012  -0.0010 
0.0013  0.0042  0.0016  0.0084  0.0023  0.0017 
Interest rate(-1)  -0.0017  -0.0003  -0.0012  -0.0141  -0.0119  -0.0070 
0.0037  0.0082  0.0029  0.0141  0.0060  0.0060 
Interest rate(-2) -0.0002  -0.0145  -0.0050  0.0051  0.0103  0.0018 
0.0037  0.0074  0.0032  0.0086  0.0059  0.0055 
Oil price(-1) 0.0023  0.0032  0.0006  -0.0014  0.0004  -0.0020 
0.0012  0.0020  0.0008  0.0019  0.0011  0.0018 
Oil price(-2) 0.0008  0.0075  -0.0010  0.0014  -0.0018  -0.0008 
0.0015  0.0029  0.0008  0.0021  0.0011  0.0022 
Terms of Trade(-1) -0.0016  -0.0060  -0.0003  0.0009  0.0004  0.0008 
0.0008  0.0029  0.0007  0.0017  0.0006  0.0008 
Terms of trade(-2) -0.0006  -0.0062  0.0000  -0.0021  -0.0009  -0.0004 
0.0008  0.0024  0.0006  0.0024  0.0006  0.0006 
GDP Growth(-1) -0.1055  -0.3782  0.5583  0.3024  0.4125  0.0782 
0.3141  0.2763  0.2480  0.2823  0.2318  0.2862 
GDP Growth(-2) -0.2697  -0.2274  -0.3432  -0.5638  -0.3554  -0.4469 
0.2593  0.2431  0.2270  0.3564  0.2325  0.3290 
R-squared 0.7911  0.7293  0.9105  0.3192  0.7433  0.5482 27
Table A. 3
Dependent variable: Primary Surplus of the Public Sector
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador
   Variable
Constant 0.0580  -0.1331  -0.2243  0.1958  -0.0241  0.1567  0.0911 
0.0523  0.1115  0.2577  0.0925  0.0736  0.1442  0.0738 
Trend 0.0003  0.0001  0.0157  -0.0032  0.0012  0.0008  0.0010 
0.0009  0.0021  0.0041  0.0019  0.0018  0.0021  0.0015 
Interest rate(-1)  -0.0019  0.0083  0.0028  -0.0073  -0.0047  0.0012  0.0032 
0.0016  0.0080  0.0042  0.0043  0.0024  0.0031  0.0023 
Interest rate(-2) -0.0033  -0.0057  0.0030  0.0054  0.0032  0.0013  0.0020 
0.0014  0.0064  0.0040  0.0032  0.0019  0.0024  0.0023 
Oil price(-1) -0.0003  0.0048  -0.0019  0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0010  -0.0027 
0.0003  0.0021  0.0008  0.0007  0.0005  0.0007  0.0008 
Oil price(-2) 0.0002  0.0013  0.0007  -0.0016  -0.0007  0.0004  0.0025 
0.0003  0.0022  0.0008  0.0007  0.0004  0.0007  0.0014 
Terms of Trade(-1) 0.0002  -0.0008  0.0021  -0.0003  0.0002  -0.0008  0.0003 
0.0003  0.0007  0.0011  0.0004  0.0002  0.0005  0.0005 
Terms of trade(-2) -0.0006  -0.0002  -0.0014  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0007  -0.0010 
0.0003  0.0009  0.0010  0.0004  0.0002  0.0006  0.0005 
GDP Growth(-1) -0.0626  1.0887  0.0125  0.1511  0.3419  0.1851  -0.0492 
0.0634  0.6856  0.1854  0.1054  0.2610  0.1727  0.1427 
GDP Growth(-2) -0.0867  0.9976  -0.2785  0.0925  0.0099  -0.1538  -0.2777 
0.0672  0.4354  0.1975  0.0820  0.2802  0.1817  0.1053 
Primary Surplus(-1) 0.2405  2.1698  -0.5133  0.2321  -0.2749  0.1690  0.8974 
0.2382  1.1659  0.2201  0.3347  0.4440  0.2379  0.2241 
Primary Surplus(-2) -0.0837  0.6718  -0.8454  -0.0737  0.1285  -0.8521  -0.7097 
0.2333  1.7073  0.2462  0.2492  0.3016  0.2291  0.1683 
R-squared 0.8296  0.8721  0.9620  0.8774  0.8642  0.8990  0.9630 28
Table A. 3 (continued)
Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
   Variable
Constant 0.0718  -0.2363  -0.0318  0.0765  0.2678  0.0970 
0.0671 0.2587 0.0599  0.1264  0.0937  0.0600 
Trend 0.0030  0.0060  0.0011  -0.0011  -0.0028  -0.0022 
0.0014  0.0042  0.0010  0.0023  0.0018  0.0020 
Interest rate(-1)  -0.0033  -0.0027  0.0004  0.0011  -0.0051  -0.0042 
0.0025  0.0060  0.0011  0.0043  0.0027  0.0092 
Interest rate(-2) 0.0046  0.0006  0.0014  -0.0021  0.0049  -0.0009 
0.0025  0.0052  0.0011  0.0026  0.0026  0.0055 
Oil price(-1) 0.0012  0.0025  -0.0006  0.0002  0.0003  -0.0015 
0.0008  0.0021  0.0003  0.0005  0.0005  0.0020 
Oil price(-2) -0.0005  -0.0012  0.0002  -0.0005  -0.0018  0.0005 
0.0011  0.0022  0.0003  0.0006  0.0005  0.0022 
Terms of Trade(-1) -0.0012  -0.0002  0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0004  0.0004 
0.0005  0.0018  0.0002  0.0005  0.0004  0.0009 
Terms of trade(-2) 0.0001  0.0008  -0.0004  -0.0001  -0.0008  -0.0000 
0.0006  0.0016  0.0002  0.0007  0.0003  0.0006 
GDP Growth(-1) -0.3339  -0.0817  0.2010  -0.0401  -0.1015  0.0398 
0.2261  0.2095  0.0812  0.0916  0.1625  0.3065 
GDP Growth(-2) -0.3009  -0.1216  0.0331  -0.1792  -0.2841  -0.1694 
0.2150  0.2135  0.0892  0.1001  0.1386  0.3197 
Primary Surplus(-1) -0.3855  0.2546  0.4678  0.3506  0.2598  0.6948 
0.2636  0.5532  0.2312  0.2888  0.3011  0.3571 
Primary Surplus(-2) -0.0361  0.1538  -0.1003  -0.0744  0.6035  -0.8747 
0.2452  0.5016  0.1919  0.2735  0.3439  0.5672 
R-squared 0.8323  0.7829  0.9079  0.6693  0.8165  0.7272 